AVI GLOBAL TRUST
PLC
('AGT' or the 'Company')
LEI:
213800QUODCLWWRVI968
Announcement of unaudited
results for the half-year ended 31 March 2024
Half Year Financial Report for the year ended 31 March
2024
A copy of the Company's Annual
Report for the half year ended 31 March 2024 will shortly be
available to view and download from the Company's website,
https://www.aviglobal.co.uk. Neither the
contents of the Company's website nor the contents of any website
accessible from hyperlinks on the Company's website (or any other
website) is incorporated into, or forms part of, this
announcement.
Dividend
The Directors have declared the
payment of an interim dividend of 1.2 pence per Ordinary Share for
the period ended 31 March 2024, which will be paid on 19 July 2024
to Ordinary shareholders on the register at the close of business
on 21 June 2024 (ex-dividend 20 June 2024).
The following text is copied from
the Half-Year Report and Accounts:
OBJECTIVE
The investment objective of the
Company is to achieve capital growth through a focused portfolio of
investments, particularly in companies whose shares stand at a
discount to estimated underlying net asset value.
FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
- Net asset value ('NAV') total
return per share increased +13.9%
- Share price total return
+16.0%
- Benchmark index±
increased on a total return basis +16.1%
- Interim dividend maintained at
1.2p
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
|
Six months
to
|
Six months
to
|
|
31 March
2024
|
31 March
2023
|
Net
asset value per share (total return)
1*
|
+13.9%
|
+5.3%
|
Share price total return*
|
+16.0%
|
+5.5%
|
|
|
|
|
31 March
2024
|
31 March
2023
|
Discount* (difference between share price and net asset
value)2
|
9.4%
|
10.4%
|
|
|
|
|
Six months
to
|
Six months
to
|
|
31 March
2024
|
31 March
2023
|
Earnings and Dividends
|
|
|
Investment income
|
£9.99m
|
£9.40m
|
Revenue earnings per
share
|
1.28p
|
1.28p
|
Capital earnings per
share
|
9.42p
|
9.42p
|
Total earnings per share
|
10.70p
|
10.70p
|
Ordinary dividends per
share
|
1.20p
|
1.20p
|
Expense Ratio (annualised)*
|
|
|
Management, marketing and other
expenses as a percentage of average shareholders' funds
|
0.88%
|
0.84%
|
|
High
|
Low
|
Period Highs/Lows
|
|
|
Net asset value per share
|
252.88p
|
207.84p
|
Net asset value per share (debt at
fair value)
|
255.40p
|
211.81p
|
Share price (mid market)
|
231.50p
|
187.80p
|
1 As per guidelines issued by the Association of Investment
Companies ('AIC'), performance is calculated using net asset values
per share inclusive of accrued income and debt marked to fair
value.
2 As per guidelines issued by the AIC, the discount is
calculated using the net asset value per share inclusive of accrued
income and with the debt marked to fair value.
Buybacks
During the six months ended 31 March
2024 the Company purchased 11,596,895 Ordinary Shares for
cancellation for an aggregate consideration of £24,245,000 adding
+0.2% to AGT's NAV.
*Alternative Performance Measures
For all Alternative Performance
Measures included in this Report, please see definitions in the
Glossary in the Half-Year Report and
Accounts.
± MSCI All Country World Index, please refer to the Glossary in
the Half-Year Report and Accounts for further
information.
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
Having traded in a range of
approximately 180p-200p since the beginning of 2022, the share
price increased steadily following a dip in October 2023 and ended
the period at over 230p. Over the six months from 30 September 2023
to 31 March 2024, the share price total return1 was
+16.0%, while the NAV total return1 was +13.9%, a
commendable return which was driven by some notable successes which
are described in more detail in the Investment Manager's
Report.
Over the six months under review,
stock markets reacted positively to macroeconomic news, which was
better than had previously been expected, with fears of recession
and inflation abating. Market returns were driven both by this news
and by continued excitement around the prospects for Artificial
Intelligence ('AI'), which drove up the share prices of a small
number of very large companies which form a high proportion of our
benchmark index. The return on our comparator benchmark, the MSCI
AC World Index, was +16.1% over the six-month period. Our
Investment Manager has a broad-based approach and focuses on
investing in companies which, in general, combine growth prospects
with attractive share price valuations and, while not focusing on
the fashionable parts of the market, was able to deliver strong
returns for shareholders.
Revenue and dividend
Revenue earnings for the period were
1.38 pence per share. The Board has elected to pay an interim
dividend of 1.2p per share, which is the same as last year. The
Board recognises that a dividend which is steady and able to rise
over time is attractive to many shareholders and, while we do aim
to grow the dividend over time, I would like to repeat my previous
statement that the portfolio is managed primarily for capital
growth.
Share price rating and marketing
AGT has a substantial marketing
budget and the Board works closely with AVI as it seeks to generate
demand for the shares. Each month AVI produces an informative fact
sheet which is available on our website and I encourage you to
register on the site to receive these when they are published. AVI
is also active in the media - both traditional and increasingly
social media - as we seek to promote our investment proposition to
a growing investor base. The Board is pleased to note that our
marketing efforts have resulted in a substantial increase over time
in the number of shares owned via retail investment platforms, and
indeed these platforms make up four of our top five
shareholders.
In common with many investment
trusts, our shares continued to trade at a frustratingly persistent
discount. We use share buybacks when the discount is unnaturally
wide and when the Board believes that buying back shares is in the
best interests of shareholders. This is also an approach that our
Investment Manager encourages for many of our investee companies.
There are periods when we buy back shares on most working days and,
during the six months under review, 11.6 million shares were bought
back, representing 2.3% of the shares in issue as at the start of
the period. As well as benefiting shareholders by limiting the
discount at which they could sell shares if they so wish, buying
back shares at a discount also produced an uplift in value to the
benefit of continuing shareholders, of approximately
0.2%.
In April we announced that Panmure
Gordon had been appointed as the Company's corporate broker. We
look forward to working with the team at Panmure Gordon,
particularly in seeking to find new shareholders. I would also like
to thank our previous corporate brokers, Jefferies, for their help
and support over the last several years.
In the 2023 Annual Report I raised
the issue of the unintended consequences on the investment trust
industry of recent regulatory pronouncements relating to Consumer
Duty in respect of cost disclosures. In particular, the inclusion
of costs embedded in our underlying investee funds in the overall
cost figures disclosed in relation to your Company is misleading.
The apparent lack of understanding associated with this disclosure
and the consequent misinterpretation puts us at an unreasonable
disadvantage when it comes to assessing the value of investing in
the Company. This could lead to a reduced demand for our shares.
For example, the Board is aware that both the potential for new
investment in the Company and the reinvestment of dividends issued
by the Company have been blocked for investors using the
fidelity.co.uk platform. We have requested the management of the
Fidelity platform to explain the reasons that have caused them to
suspend investment in your Company's shares on their platform. Rest
assured we have taken this extremely seriously and have raised the
issue and in particular the lack of transparency with the Financial
Conduct Authority and our trade body the AIC. More broadly, efforts
also continue to find a solution to correct the misleading approach
to cost disclosure by putting pressure on government and
regulators. We remain hopeful that the result will be a fair and
logical outcome although recognise that the UK General Election may
cause delays in any decisions to change the disclosure
regime.
Annual general meeting
All resolutions at the Company's AGM
on 20 December 2023 were passed by a large majority and I would
like to thank shareholders for their continuing support. It was
good to meet a number of shareholders at the meeting. We welcome
the opportunity to engage with shareholders and if you have any
questions or points that you would like to raise with the Board,
please send an email to aviglobal_cosec@linkgroup.co.uk
or write to: The Company Secretary, AVI Global
Trust PLC, 65 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7NQ.
Outlook
Stock market returns over the six
months under review were very strong but I would caution that
economies and markets are not immune from further headwinds. While
better than expected economic news helped to propel markets, there
is a risk of setbacks and the geopolitical background remains
unstable, both of which could cause markets to fall.
Against this background our
Investment Manager describes a number of opportunities for growth
in the investment portfolio. Their focus on acquiring stakes in
companies at attractive valuations has proven resilient and their
persistence in pursuing value was demonstrated, for example, by the
takeover bids for Hipgnosis Songs Fund in April. As ever, there
will be unexpected events along the way but we are optimistic that
the portfolio and investment process are well set to continue
delivering attractive returns.
Graham Kitchen
Chairman
4 June 2024
1 An Alternative Performance Measure: see Glossary in the Half-Year Report and Accounts.
INVESTMENT MANAGER'S REPORT
PERFORMANCE REVIEW
Your Company's NAV is some +23%
higher than when we wrote to you this time last year. At the time
sentiment was dour; investors were fretting as to the potential
fallout from the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank; inflation
remained stubbornly high; and the deeply inverted yield curve was
flashing red that the most anticipated recession in recent history
was about to bite.
A year on and there has been no real
contagion from the regional banking crisis, with the actions of the
United States Federal Reserve having ensured financial stability.
The picture on inflation has certainly improved, but we are not off
the mountain just yet. And a recession remains the watched pot that
hasn't boiled, with the economy proving much stronger than many had
anticipated.
These better-than-expected
developments, combined with strong share price performance of a
narrow-band of US technology companies, that are thought to be
beneficiaries of AI, has propelled markets to new all-time
highs.
For the interim period since
September, AGT has produced a NAV total return of +13.9%. This was
slightly behind the performance of our comparator benchmark, the
MSCI AC World Index (£), which returned +16.1%.
From the very wide levels observed
in October 2023 - when the portfolio weighted average discount hit
37.0% - discounts have started to narrow, such that the weighted
average discount at period end stands at 31.5%. We have taken
advantage of this, fully exiting positions in Pershing Square
Holdings and Godrej Industries, and reducing positions in strong
performers, Schibsted, FEMSA, KKR and Apollo.
KKR was the standout performer
adding +253bps to returns. Having initiated a position in the
company in 2020, we have held a decidedly different view to the
market on the durability of the company's earnings power and growth
prospects. The market has been coming round to our way of thinking,
with the shares up by +319% over that time, and we have been
reducing the position.
We continue to believe this is a
stock picker's market, and a market where a focus on events,
catalysts, and activism to crystallise value is important.
Illustrative of this is Schibsted, which has undergone significant
structural simplification (detail below) and was one of the
strongest performers over the period.
Over the six-month period we have
been adding to News Corp, D'Ieteren, Bollore and Entain, all of
which have attractive underlying fundamentals and NAV growth
prospects combined with potential catalysts.
Despite Hipgnosis Songs Fund being a
detractor over the interim period and requiring a lot of work and
intensive engagement from our investment team, a takeover battle
subsequent to the period end has resulted in an excellent outcome
for shareholders. We expand on this below.
Contributors and Detractors
for the six months ending 31 March 2024
|
|
Contribution*
|
Contributors
|
|
KKR and Co
|
2.53%
|
Schibsted 'B'
|
1.77%
|
D'Ieteren Group
|
1.21%
|
Godrej Industries
|
1.08%
|
News Corp
|
1.07%
|
|
|
Detractors
|
|
Symphony International
Holdings
|
-0.82%
|
Aker ASA
|
-0.52%
|
Entain
|
-0.46%
|
Hipgnosis Songs Fund
|
-0.39%
|
Keisei Electric Railway
|
-0.12%
|
* Contribution is the percentage
amount that a position has added to the Company's net asset value
over the six-month period.
More generally, over the last 18
months our exposure to closed-end funds has increased. There is a
structural lack of interest in such companies, almost entirely for
non-fundamental reasons, and we believe this to be an attractive
opportunity set with discounts at wide levels where we can add
value through activism.
The opportunity for engagement in
Japan also remains compelling. Long-term readers of our reports
will know that we have spent a significant amount of focus on
Japanese small-cap equities since 2016/17, when it became clear to
us that the winds of change had begun to blow, and that the
corporate governance reform agenda had gained critical
momentum.
2023 was something of a (re) coming
out party for Japanese equities - which are becoming increasingly
relevant again to international equity investors, who have grown to
appreciate the very clear agenda of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
('TSE') and other authorities in unlocking corporate value. As is
to be expected, flows have concentrated on larger cap companies,
which have outperformed smaller caps. For unhedged international
investors (such as ourselves) the continued depreciation of the Yen
has proved a headwind. We do not expect this to persist
indefinitely.
Far from the madding crowd of
increasingly concentrated equity markets, it remains an exciting
and fruitful time for our approach to investing. Discounts have
started to narrow but remain relatively wide by historical
standards and we are finding a high number of attractive
opportunities from all parts of our universe. Reflective of this,
net gearing (debt at fair value) has continued to increase and
stands at 9.6% as of the period end.
As we look ahead, we remain humble
in the unpredictability of financial markets and macro events. Our
conviction, however, is built from the bottom up. We have assembled
a concentrated-yet-diverse collection of companies that should
compound NAV at attractive rates; discounts are generally wide and
across the portfolio there are numerous potential corporate
catalysts to unlock value. We believe this to be an attractive
medley.
CONTRIBUTORS
KKR
&
Co
(Discount: 5.4%/Contribution: +2.53%)
KKR was the largest contributor to
AGT's returns over the six-month period, adding 2.53% to NAV as its
share price soared +64%. Since the position entered the portfolio
in 2020, it has been a very strong source of returns for AGT. Our
thesis back then was that the listed alternative asset management
sector was systematically undervalued, and that KKR (and Apollo,
which we also own) was itself undervalued relative to
peers.
While the market seems to have since
come closer to our way of thinking, the level of share price
volatility suggests alternative asset managers are still perceived
as high beta plays on risk assets. While we concede that both KKR
and Apollo have more on-balance sheet risk than peers, our
contention is that the market underestimates the defensive
characteristics of scale-advantaged managers that earn fees on
long-dated committed capital, and the powerful tailwinds for
structural growth across the industry. This volatility has inured
to the benefit of AGT shareholders as we have opportunistically
added to our shareholding in periods of weakness.
During the period, KKR announced it
was to acquire the 37% of life insurer Global Atlantic that it did
not already own. This was taken well by the market, as was the
accompanying announcement of a further shareholder-friendly change
to the company's compensation structure.
In the words of KKR co-CEO Scott
Nuttall, Global Atlantic - in which KKR acquired a majority stake
in 2020 - has been a 'home-run investment'. With Global Atlantic's
assets more than doubling from the point of acquisition to today,
it is hard to argue otherwise, with KKR's ownership also helping
scale its real estate credit and asset-based finance businesses
whose assets sit well on insurance company balance
sheets.
The remaining stake in Global
Atlantic was purchased at book value, the same multiple as the
original acquisition and a low valuation for a mid-teens ROE
business. Crucially, the $2.7bn acquisition price was funded
entirely in cash. There had been some fears, given the right the
minority shareholders had to force KKR to either list the business
or acquire it from them, that KKR would issue shares to pay for it.
This is where KKR's remarkably strong balance sheet came into play,
with the company having $3.8bn in cash and with long-term fixed
rate debt in place (at a weighted average interest rate of 3.9% and
maturity of 2041).
We attended KKR's Investor Day in
New York City in April 2024, at which management laid out a clear
path to more than tripling net income per share within ten years or
less with multiple routes to achieving this forecast. In
particular, Asia, Infrastructure, and Private Investment Grade
Credit were identified as key market/asset classes given their
capacity and where demand is spiking higher.
Blackstone's success in raising
capital from private wealth channels has materially raised the
total addressable market for the alternative asset managers. While
KKR's presence in this space is still relatively nascent, they have
invested heavily in distribution and expect 30-50% of new KKR
capital to be sourced from private wealth channels over the next
several years. The size of the market is so vast that even a small
up-tick in allocations to alternatives could have seismic results,
with an expected increase from 2% in 2022 to 6% in 2025 translating
to an additional $11trn of inflows. We expect there to be only a
few winners in this space, consisting of the largest managers with
the most recognised brands. Given this, it was highly encouraging
to learn at the Investor Day that 2024 YTD inflows to 1 April 2024
had already reached $2.8bn, a very sizeable increase on Q4 of
2023's $1.4bn.
Given the material re-rating in the
shares, our investment in KKR is closer to its end than other
still-heavily discounted names in our portfolio. That said, 2023
saw Blackstone become the first alternative asset manager to enter
the S&P 500, and we believe it is a matter of time before KKR
and Apollo are also selected for inclusion. This could lead to as
much as 20% of their free float being bought by index-tracker and
'index-aware' investment vehicles.
Schibsted ASA
(Discount: 8.0%/Contribution: +1.77%)
Schibsted was the second largest
contributor, adding +177bps to AGT's NAV.
It has been a busy period for the
company which has undergone significant change and taken
considerable steps to unlock value.
In the most recent Annual Report
(page 41) we explained that Permira and Blackstone had entered
negotiations to take Adevinta private. In November 2023, this came
to fruition with a 115 NOK per share offer. The transaction - which
is due to complete in Q2 of 2024 - will see Schibsted sell 60% of
their 28% stake for 24bn NOK, which accounted for 48% of the
preannouncement market cap (based on the B share price). Schibsted
will retain an 11.1% stake in Adevinta post-transaction, which, at
the 115 NOK per share value, equates to 16bn NOK (31% of
Schibsted's preannouncement market cap).
Shortly thereafter, in early
December 2023, Schibsted positively surprised both us and the
market with the announcement that the Tinius Trust, the controlling
shareholder, intends to acquire Schibsted's legacy News Media
division and Schibsted's stake in Polaris Media for a combined
value of 6.3bn NOK. This is a significant positive development that
removes a terminally challenged, capital consuming problem child
from the group structure. This will lead to an improvement in the
consolidated financials, boost margins, reduce capex, increase
returns on capital employed and improve cash conversion.
The combination of these two
transactions has realised gross proceeds approaching 30bn NOK. 20bn
NOK will be returned to shareholders, as special dividend, with a
further 4bn NOK in buybacks and 5bn NOK used to extinguish net
debt.
These steps have reduced structural
complexity and shone a light on Schibsted's Nordic Marketplace
assets - which have hitherto been overlooked. These businesses have
dominant market positions, are under-monetised versus international
peers, and have significant room for margin expansion, with EBITDA
expected to grow at close to +20% p.a. over the coming
years.
Reflective of the significant
re-rating in the shares our position has been reduced by
approximately 50% from its peak, such that Schibsted was a 5.1%
stake as at the end of March 2024.
To date the investment - which was
initiated slightly under two years ago - has delivered an IRR of
+50% (in NOK).
D'Ieteren
(Discount: 32.6%/Contribution: +1.21%)
D'Ieteren was a meaningful
contributor to returns during the interim period, adding +121bps to
performance. Over the interim period the shares rose +29%, which
was a function of +14% NAV growth and narrowing of the discount to
33% from 40%.
As readers may remember the bulk of
the value (61% of NAV) lies in Belron, the global no.1 operator in
the Vehicle Glass Repair and Replacement ('VGRR') industry which
readers might be more familiar with as Autoglass (UK), Safelite
(US) or Carglass (EU).
Belron is many multiples larger than
competitors with more than 40% US market share, resulting in
significant scale advantages in terms of purchasing economies of
scale and cost leadership, as well as relationships with insurance
partners who are industry gatekeepers and account for c.70% of
jobs. Moreover, scale has allowed for technological investment,
which has become increasingly relevant as advanced driver
assistance system ('ADAS') recalibrations - which require more
expensive capital equipment - have grown to become a larger
proportion of replacement jobs. 'Mom and pop' operators are
increasingly ill-suited to meet the increased technical complexity
required for new vehicles.
As such, we expect Belron to
continue taking share and driving growth. For FY23 Belron grew
sales by +9% organically with a further boost of +2% from M&A.
A positive mix effect and price increases saw operating margins
increase +226bps to 20.5%, which led operating profits to increase
+22% year on year. For the year ahead, management are forecasting
sales to grow at mid-to-high-single digits and margins to continue
towards what for some time now has appeared a relatively modest
2025 margin target of 23%. We expect Belron to provide updated
targets at next year's Capital Markets Day - which will be the
first since Carlos Brito became CEO.
In 2021 a consortium of private
equity investors (led by Hellman & Friedman) became minority
shareholders in Belron at a €21bn enterprise value. We estimate
that the enterprise value is closer to €24.5bn today (17x our 2024
estimated EBIT), and D'Ieteren's 50% equity interest accounts for
61% of D'Ieteren's NAV.
In due course we expect a liquidity
event for these investors to help highlight Belron's significant
value, and like to invest in situations such as this where we are
aligned with highly incentivised PE co-owners and management teams.
As such we see scope for a further narrowing of D'Ieteren's 33%
discount, as well as NAV growth underpinned by strong earnings
growth prospects. We added to the position by some +25% over the
last six months.
Godrej Industries
(Discount: 59.7%/Contribution: +1.08%)
Godrej Industries - the Indian
holding company - added +108bps to returns during the interim
period as the discount narrowed meaningfully. We took the
opportunity to exit the investment.
Since 2019 AGT generated an ROI/IRR
of +41%/+9%, in Sterling, having suffered from a -17% FX headwind
and -10% return on account of a widening discount. The return was
broadly in line with the MSCI ACWI (£) over the same period (+43%),
however underperforming the MSCI India (+60%), with the discount
widening having been an impediment to returns.
Whilst Godrej Industries owns a
fundamentally attractive collection of underlying assets, and the
controlling family have shown themselves to be good long-term
stewards of capital, we took advantage of relatively fleeting
liquidity in the shares. This has allowed for capital to be
recycled into investments, such as those described in these pages,
with clearer catalysts for discount narrowing.
News Corp
(Discount: 38.7%/Contribution: +1.07%)
In 2023 we initiated a position in
News Corp, the Murdoch family controlled holding company. The
shares have performed strongly, adding +107bps to returns over the
period. Today News Corp is your Company's largest position (8.3%
weight) and embodies what we look for in an investment: attractive
quality assets, trading at a discounted valuation, with prospective
catalysts to unlock value.
Whilst the current structure was
established in 2013, the relevant history dates back to 1952, when
a 21-year-old Rupert Murdoch returned to Australia from Oxford to
take over what was left of his father's newspaper business, which
had been much diminished by death duties and taxes. From this he
built one of the most dominant media empires of the 20th
- and indeed 21st - century, amassing vast wealth and notoriety in
the process.
Today we believe that News Corp is
one of the most misvalued and misunderstood companies in our
investment universe, trading at a 38.1% discount to our estimated
NAV. The NAV is principally comprised of the following assets: a
62% listed stake in REA Group (41% of NAV), the Australian real
estate classified marketplace, and unlisted assets Dow Jones,
HarperCollins and Move accounting for 37%, 10%, and 7%,
respectively.
In particular, Dow Jones is a crown
jewel asset that has successfully evolved the Wall Street Journal
into a thriving digital consumer business, whilst both organically
and inorganically building a high quality Professional Information
business that warrants a premium multiple, reflective of its sticky
and growing revenues, high margins, and minimal capex requirements.
The 2021 acquisition of OPIS for $1.1bn marks a step-change in the
importance and materiality of Dow Jones' Professional Information
business. The value and quality of this business is misunderstood
by the sell side and ignored by the market.
Adjusting for the stake in REA, the
stub trades at an implied value of $5.4bn, or approximately 4.7x
next year's EBITDA. We estimate that Dow Jones alone is worth ~1.6x
the implied stub value and note that the New York Times trades at
15x and Info Services peers trade between 19-29x. Management have
become increasingly vocal about the undervaluation.
As CEO Robert Thomson described on
the last earnings call, the company is engaged in "serious
introspection about structure…and how to fully monetize a precious,
prestigious portfolio that has an obvious growth trajectory. That
is indeed not an evolution, but a revolution".
At current prices, the market is
seemingly ascribing a low probability to 'a revolution', with
significant upside if management do indeed take concrete and
tangible steps to unlock value. Combined with strong operating and
earnings momentum, prospective returns appear
attractive.
DETRACTORS
Symphony International Holdings
(Discount: 49.8%/Contribution: -0.82%)
Symphony International ('SIHL') was
our largest detractor over the period with a -24% decline in its
(US Dollar denominated) share price exacerbated by a Sterling rally
from the lows reached during the brief Liz Truss-led government.
The share price decrease was almost entirely due to a widening
discount which expanded from 36% to 50%.
To recap, SIHL is a London-listed
investment company with a focus on predominantly unlisted (85% of
current NAV) Asian consumer and real estate businesses. The
investment, initiated in 2012, has been weak in absolute and
relative terms with an IRR of just over 5% over our holding period.
As the largest independent shareholder, we have worked to improve
corporate governance at the company and unlock value trapped in the
persistently wide discount at which the shares have traded. This
culminated in a 2021 public campaign to Save
Symphony. In September 2023, the
company announced it would pursue an orderly realisation of its
investments.
As such, our ultimate returns from
SIHL will depend on the prices at which it realises its investments
and the timeframe over which these realisations take place, rather
than its share price on the screen at any particular point in time.
SIHL's shares trade at a sizable bid-offer spread (10% at 31 March
2024), are tightly-held and thinly traded, and are heavily impacted
in both directions by relatively small order sizes. Indeed, since
the half year-end, the shares are up +13% as at 30 April
2024.
That SIHL's shares trade at such a
wide discount despite the company having adopted a managed wind-up
strategy reflects, in our view, scepticism around a management team
that has historically prioritised its own interests over those of
shareholders; uncertainty over the timeframe over which
realisations will take place; and - as is often the case with
investment companies with unlisted assets - wariness over whether
the carrying values of assets are an accurate reflection of
realisable values.
We understand these concerns.
However, we contend that while the management team continues to add
to their already substantial shareholdings, they have little
incentive to maintain or increase reported valuations to
artificially high levels and that an incentive may in fact exist in
the opposite direction. That said, they also have little incentive
to expedite asset sales and returns of capital while they still
believe there is stock available to purchase to add to the over
one-third of the company held by management and the board. Noting
the pace of management purchases has slowed recently in the face of
low volumes, we may not be far from the point where their attention
turns to unlocking the value in their shareholdings trapped by the
huge discount to NAV. Based on secondary market transactions, it is
plausible that a sale of SIHL's minority stake in Vietnamese
logistics player Indo-Trans Logistics could generate proceeds
covering well over half of the company's current market
cap.
Aker ASA
(Discount: 23.5%/Contribution: -0.52%)
Aker was a detractor over the
interim period. The shares declined by -3% on a total return basis,
as a -4% decline in the NAV was ever so slightly cushioned by a
small narrowing of the discount to 24%. AGT suffered from a -490bps
weakening of the NOK versus Sterling.
Sluggish NAV performance is largely
attributable to Aker BP (60% of NAV), which has underperformed
peers and rising oil prices - particularly in the calendar year
2024, during which period the shares declined by -6% whilst oil
prices have risen by +13%.
Production guidance for 2024 was
slightly softer than the market had anticipated, with increased
uncertainty regarding the eventual plateau of the Johan Sverdrup
oilfield and whether this would occur in late 2024 or during 2025.
With Johan Sverdrup having consistently outperformed expectations
since production started in 2019 this has been digested poorly by
the market, with Aker BP shares now trading on a 9.4% dividend
yield - a level rarely observed in the company's history. This
appears good value to us for a low-cost-low-emission producer
operating in a stable and attractive fiscal regime. We believe that
operators such as Aker BP, with a long-dated production schedule,
are likely to prosper in a world where oil will play an important
and elongated role in the energy mix, and there is limited
supply.
Accessing this on a 24% discount
with a strong alignment of interest and a controlling shareholder
with a track record of significant value creation is highly
attractive.
Entain
(Discount: 33.7%/Contribution: -0.46%)
During the interim period, we
started to build a position in Entain, the London-listed sports
betting and gambling company. The shares continued to fall
throughout the period as we averaged down, detracting 46bps from
returns.
We came across Entain through our
long-standing investment in IAC (3% of AGT NAV), which has a stake
in MGM Resorts International; in turn, Entain and MGM are joint
venture partners in BetMGM, one of the leading online sports
betting and iGaming brands in the nascent US market. We believe
this to be a highly desirable asset in a rapidly growing market
that, we believe, will coalesce around a handful of
operators.
Today, Entain has three principal
assets at different stages of maturity, with the true value being
masked by the current structure of the company. These are the
online operations (68% of portfolio), retail operations (11%) and
the 50% equity accounted stake in BetMGM (21%).
Entain's online operations have
undergone a significant period of regulatory change across multiple
key markets, with the UK being the most notable. In the short-run
regulation can be hugely disruptive for gambling companies, but in
the long-run it acts as a barrier to entry and entrenches the
position of incumbents, such as Entain.
That said, Entain's handling of
these UK changes has been subpar, taking a more tailored approach
to the regulation than rivals which has added complexity and
confusion, particularly for customers. The broader implementation
of these regulatory changes has not been universal, with Entain
(and other tier-one operators) ceding market share to tier-two and
tier-three rivals, who have yet to put these changes through. With
the new rules likely to be enforced in September 2024, expectations
are for some degree of reversal in market share losses. Management
has set aside £40m in marketing spend in anticipation of
this.
BetMGM has continued to see its
estimated market share erode, with the gap to industry leaders
widening over 2023. The key culprit for this erosion has been a
product gap with peers. Given that Entain provides the technology
for BetMGM, it was up to them to come up with solutions. Through
organic investment and some small M&A, BetMGM's product has
improved materially over 2023, closing the product gap. Management
now has a degree of confidence in the product, indicating that 2024
will be a 'year of investment' focusing on marketing to try to claw
back some market share.
Given the equity-accounted nature of
BetMGM, we do not believe that its true value is currently being
captured in Entain's valuation. Based on our carrying value, BetMGM
makes up an estimated 52% and 29% of Entain's market cap and
enterprise value, respectively. As a result, we estimate the stub
trades at 9.1x NTM* EBIT versus a peer group average of 12.9x and
Entain's longer-term average of 14.2x. This equates to an implied
9.3% FCF** yield.
Since December, there has been
significant change at both the managerial and board levels. Jette
Nygaard-Andersen stepped down as CEO, having successfully guided
the company through an HMRC investigation but whose limited
gambling experience started to show. She was replaced by Stella
David, an independent board member, on an interim basis, with
positive early impressions.
After the interim period ended, it
was announced that the chairman of the board, Barry Gibson, is to
step down with Stella replacing him. We view these changes
positively, and another step in repairing some of the damage done
over the last couple of years.
We believe that organic growth,
earnings, sentiment and valuation are at the lows. With a swarm of
activists on the shareholder register - and indeed now on the board
- we do not believe that the current valuation will persist
indefinitely with numerous potential paths to unlock value, not
least from BetMGM which is a highly strategic asset.
* NTM EBIT = forecasted EBIT for the
next twelve months
** FCF = Free cash flow (Operating
Cash flow - Capex)
Hipgnosis Songs Fund
(Discount: 24.8%/Contribution: -0.39%)
While Hipgnosis Songs Fund ('SONG')
may have been a detractor over the period covered by this report,
events after the period end have resulted in substantial gains for
AGT shareholders.
A bidding war was triggered in April
2024 when Concord - a music rights firm backed by Apollo -
announced a binding offer for SONG at a price of $1.16-$1.18 per
share. Blackstone, the majority owner of Hipgnosis Songs Management
(the Manager of SONG), ultimately prevailed with a bid of $1.30 per
share. This represents a premium of +47% to the undisturbed share
price.
This marks the end of a highly
successful investment for AGT, in which we played a key role in
fighting off the proposed related-party sale of a portion of SONG's
catalogues and also making the case against the company continuing
in its present form. Resolutions proposing each matter were heavily
defeated at shareholder meetings. With two directors resigning on
the eve of the AGM and the then-Chairman suffering a resounding
vote against his re-election, we and other shareholders engaged
with the remaining rump to push for the appointment of two new
directors - Robert Naylor and Francis Keeling - who had just
stepped down from SONG's peer company Round Hill Music Royalty Fund
('RHM') following its acquisition by Concord. Both were appointed
with Robert immediately installed as Chairman.
We are delighted with an outcome
that has not only generated a very strong return for AGT's
shareholders but has demonstrated again both the value of
shareholder activism and the critical importance of having the
right people on Boards. The new directors joined the company at a
time of crisis and engineered an excellent outcome for shareholders
in a timeframe few would have felt possible at the time of their
appointment. With no viable future as an ongoing listed vehicle,
the key task facing the new appointees was how best to generate
competitive tension in a situation where, under the terms of the
Investment Management Agreement, the Manager had a call option
allowing them to purchase the portfolio in the event of their
termination. The investigatory work conducted by the Board and
their advisors, some of the fruits of which were made public, led
to an understandable perception that there existed more than
sufficient grounds to terminate the Manager 'for cause', which
would invalidate the option.
We think it likely that this,
alongside other measures introduced by the newly-reconstituted
Board, gave Concord the confidence to make their initial bid and
resulted in a higher price ultimately being achieved for the
company than would otherwise have been the case. We applaud the new
directors' fortitude and shrewd handling of a highly complex
situation.
AVI's involvement with SONG began
several years ago. Following research on French holding company
Vivendi and its investment in UMG, we could see the attractions of
the music rights asset class. As a pure play on catalogue, SONG had
its attractions and we established a small position in late-2020
with part of our thesis being that SONG would likely be a takeout
target once it had achieved scale. That element of the thesis broke
down in October 2021 with the acquisition of a majority stake in
the Manager by Blackstone. Given Blackstone's deep pockets, we felt
the Manager's call option over the portfolio was much more likely
to impede any competitive sales process in the future. When
combined with growing concerns over transparency, earnings quality
and governance, we took the decision to exit the position and sold
over 60% of our shareholding in late 2021/early 2022 at modest
profits on our purchase price before the share price began to
decline rapidly along with other alternative income vehicles deemed
to be interest-rate sensitive. We were left with a residual
shareholding that equated to a 0.8% stake in the
company.
Our full attention turned back to
the company following Concord's bid for RHM in September 2023, just
ahead of SONG's continuation vote and its proposal to sell a
portion of its catalogues to Blackstone in a related party deal. We
increased our stake almost ten-fold over the following six months
and generated a return on our overall investment of almost double
that of AGT's MSCI AC World benchmark. We sold out of our position
in Hipgnosis late May 2024, and generated a +39% total return/+73%
IRR on the position acquired in late 2023/early 2024 (vs +13%/+24%
respectively for the benchmark.
Keisei Electric Railway
(Discount: 31.6%/Contribution: -0.12%)
Keisei Electric Railway was a small
detractor over the period, shaving off -12bps from AGT's NAV as the
shares have returned -2% since we initiated our position on 6
November 2023.
We initiated a position in the
Japanese railway operator due to its 21% stake in the listed theme
park operator - Oriental Land ('OLC') - which accounts for 167% of
Keisei Electric's market cap pre-tax.
OLC offers exposure to Japan's
largest theme parks - Tokyo Disneyland and Tokyo DisneySea - which
are also two of the most visited theme parks in the world (#2 and
#4). OLC also owns six high-quality Disney-themed park hotels, a
further three hotels through subsidiary Milial Resorts, and the
facilities surrounding the park area - monorail, shopping mall, and
theatre.
All of this is built upon a
2,000,000m2 bank of land owned by OLC (roughly the size of Monaco)
which is located close to central Tokyo and within easy reach of
approximately 30m high income households.
In the context of wider corporate
governance reforms, we felt that Keisei Electric's stake in OLC
could become a potential target for unwinding given the lack of
synergies between the two companies and the outsized proportion of
value that it represents to Keisei. Given the underlying business
quality of both the railway operations and of OLC, we felt that we
could be patient and await any unlocking of this value.
On 7 March 2024, the company
announced that it would be cutting its stake in OLC by 1 percentage
point from 22.15% to 21.15%. This news disappointed the wider
market, which had clearly been hoping for a more significant stake
sale, sending the shares down by -9% on the day.
We consider this news to be a
significant step-change, however, demonstrating that the company
does not view OLC as a sacred asset, and that this could open the
door for further stake sales in the future. Should we see any
further unwinding of OLC, this will likely lead to outsized
prospective returns from a significant unlocking of
value.
Joe
Bauernfreund
Asset Value Investors
Limited
4 June 2024