ADVFN Logo ADVFN

We could not find any results for:
Make sure your spelling is correct or try broadening your search.

Trending Now

Toplists

It looks like you aren't logged in.
Click the button below to log in and view your recent history.

Hot Features

Registration Strip Icon for tools Level up your trading with our powerful tools and real-time insights all in one place.

TClarkes’ AGM – Non-executives out-witted by guile of executives

Share On Facebook
share on Linkedin
Print

At Friday’s AGM the non-executive directors did not have a satisfactory answer to my linked questions: “Director remuneration rose from around £1m to £1.7m in a year of very modest basic earnings (£0.1m or 0.13p per share) and with the company having only a market capitalisation £33m. Why such a jump? I’d like to link that question with the observation that if you create two columns of numbers, one with basic earnings per share (the statutory one) and one with “underlying” earnings per share you find that for 2005-7 the numbers are identical, but since then there has been a wide divergence. Could it be that there is some accounting manipulation to ensure bonuses?”

(Previous Newsletters on TClarke: 5th – 11th Nov, 19th Nov, 26th Nov 2015 and 20th – 22nd April 2016)

They were quick to say there was no manipulation. I was aware that they would answer that the bonuses for the executives were justified by the rise in “underlying/adjusted” earnings. This is what the 2015 remuneration report says on the bonuses:

“We believe in rewarding our executives based on their performance and on the value created for our shareholders. The variable elements of executive remuneration are focused on simple and transparent measures of profit before tax, EPS growth and key strategic objectives. Our bonus and long-term incentive structures are based on challenging targets….

………. I am pleased to report that the underlying profit before tax target was indeed met in 2015 and, under the terms of the remuneration policy, a bonus would be payable to directors. However, the Remuneration Committee recognises that the discontinuation of the Bristol and Cardiff operations affected the overall results of the Group. To be equitable to both the executive directors and shareholders, the Remuneration Committee has decided to award the executive directors 50% of the bonus payable.”

If you have a team of directors who for many years cleverly report much higher EPS calculated after adjustments than those that are reported under normal accounting rules, and then you base large bonuses on the “adjusted” earnings then a bad smell is going to be detected.

Fair enough, companies do have years when they have to jettison a bad division here, or incur exceptional expenses there. But to report exceptionals every year, and to then base bonuses on a number that pretends the exceptional loss never happened is to stretch credulity.

Being in the building trade myself I’m aware of the technical phrase for people who push their luck too far in charging for their efforts: We call it “Taking the P*SS”.

Too be fair I’ll present the answers they gave:
1.The board is bigger by one person this year compared with last year. I accept this as a contributory factor to the rise in remuneration.
2.The executives have done a sterling job in closing down the Bristol/Cardiff operations thus saving shareholders money in the future. I asked whether they thought that shareholders had lost a lot of money on the Bristol/Cardiff operations (those discontinued ones). At first, I did not get a straight answer. Eventually they acknowledged that shareholder wealth had been diminished by many millions by the failure in Bristol/Cardiff. So, I said, at the same time as shareholders lost massively the directors are paid a bonus, with the bonus based on ignoring the amount of money they lost for shareholders in Bristol/Cardiff? Yes, that is OK came the reply, because they have now stemmed the losses. I wonder: Who was in charge when the awful decisions were made to build-up the Bristol/Cardiff offices? Isn’t it their job to manage Bristol/Cardiff in the normal course of their duties, and, if necessary, to manage a closing down. For this they receive large salaries – why add bonuses?
3.If we do not pay them well they will go and work for a competitor. Oh, that old one. Any non-executive worth his salt plans for this ultimatum years ahead of time. At the very least you make sure there is a well-defined succession plan, with able and ambitious middle managers waiting to get the chance to prove themselves as executive directors. They can be moved onto the Board should the other executive directors fall under a bus, or try the game of “I’ll move if you don’t pay me more.”
4.They did not receive bonuses in the recession, therefore they should receive something now. Firstly, they are very well rewarded on basic pay – see below. Second, shareholders have not yet seen profits coming their way – in the last two years the company has on average broken-even if you count the discontinued operational losses as real losses to shareholders, which they are.

Unless there is a change in the remuneration policy shareholders will find over the next few years the directors will suck an undue amount from them. Here are the basic salaries and bonus amounts to be taken if they reach targets (we already know about the low level of rigour non-executives enforce):

£’000s

Fixed pay

In line with expectations

Maximum

Mark Lawrence

340

410

898

Mike Crowder

315

375

791

Martin Walton

267

319

682

Here is what the executives got in 2015, a year of virtually no increase in shareholder wealth:

   

Shares held

Mark Lawrence

£436k

39,607

Mike Crowder

£398k

31,607

Martin Walton

£338k

29,607

Danny Robson

£333k

n/a

Non-executives    
David Henderson (2015)

£37k

n/a

Iain McCusker (2016)

£49.5k

2,000

Beverley Stewart (2016)

£45.5k

21,000

Tony Giddings

£45.5k

2,000

Mike Robson

£45.5k

2,000

So they are generous to the NEDs, as well – that would not be linked to the generosity to the executives, would it? You may think so, but I could not possibly comment.

I have been told by the Chairman (after the meeting) that they will re-examine remuneration policy. I do hope they will put the interests of shareholders at the heart of the discussion.

Why have the directors………To read the rest of this article, and more like it, subscribe to my premium newsletter Deep Value Shares – click here http://newsletters.advfn.com/deepvalueshares/subscribe-1

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER FOR FREE ON ADVFN, the world's leading stocks and shares information website, provides the private investor with all the latest high-tech trading tools and includes live price data streaming, stock quotes and the option to access 'Level 2' data on all of the world's key exchanges (LSE, NYSE, NASDAQ, Euronext etc).

This area of the ADVFN.com site is for independent financial commentary. These blogs are provided by independent authors via a common carrier platform and do not represent the opinions of ADVFN Plc. ADVFN Plc does not monitor, approve, endorse or exert editorial control over these articles and does not therefore accept responsibility for or make any warranties in connection with or recommend that you or any third party rely on such information. The information available at ADVFN.com is for your general information and use and is not intended to address your particular requirements. In particular, the information does not constitute any form of advice or recommendation by ADVFN.COM and is not intended to be relied upon by users in making (or refraining from making) any investment decisions. Authors may or may not have positions in stocks that they are discussing but it should be considered very likely that their opinions are aligned with their trading and that they hold positions in companies, forex, commodities and other instruments they discuss.

Leave A Reply

 
Do you want to write for our Newspaper? Get in touch: newspaper@advfn.com