Elliott Associates Intends Not to Vote for MCI / Verizon Merger as Currently Structured
February 23 2005 - 2:45PM
PR Newswire (US)
Elliott Associates Intends Not to Vote for MCI / Verizon Merger as
Currently Structured Investment Firm Urges MCI to Consider Any
Subsequent Offers NEW YORK, Feb. 23 /PRNewswire/ -- Elliott
Associates, L.P. (together with funds under common management) is a
substantial shareholder of MCI Inc. (NASDAQ:MCIP) and today sent
the following letter to the Board of Directors of MCI Inc.:
February 23, 2005 Board of Directors MCI Inc. 22001 Loudoun County
Parkway Ashburn, VA 20147 Re: Proposed Sale of MCI Inc. Ladies and
Gentlemen: Elliott Associates, L.P. and funds under common
management ("Elliott") are the beneficial owners of approximately
2.72 million common shares of MCI Inc. (the "Company"). We are
writing with regard to the Agreement and Plan of Merger (the
"Proposed Merger") between the Company and Verizon Communications
Inc. ("Verizon"). Our purpose in writing is to express our
displeasure with the economics of the Proposed Merger and to urge
you to seriously consider any offer put forth in the future (a
"Subsequent Bid") by Qwest Communications International, Inc
("Qwest") or other interested parties. We appreciate the
significant efforts that management and the Board of Directors of
MCI (the "Board") have made over the last many months to reshape
the Company, its cost structure and its business. As a function of
having been one of the largest and most active creditors of the
predecessor company during its reorganization, Elliott is keenly
aware of the significant obstacles that the current management and
Board overcame to enable the Company to be in the position in which
it finds itself today. That said, we feel that the Board erred in
its decision with respect to the Proposed Merger. Fortunately,
based on February 17, 2005 8-K filed by Qwest, it appears likely
that Qwest will put forth a Subsequent Bid, and thus the Board will
be in a position in the near future to take the further steps
required to maximize the long-term value of the Company to its
shareholders. The offer to acquire the Company made by Qwest (the
"Initial Bid") outlined in its February 16, 2005 8-K translates
into a price of $23.82 per MCI share,(1) or roughly 17% higher than
the value of the deal currently contemplated with Verizon.(2)
Further, the initial reaction of Qwest's common stock to the mere
possibility of a deal with MCI illustrates the potential for
substantially greater value to be realized by MCI shareholders (we
note that the recent, more muted reaction of Qwest stock to the
possibility of a Subsequent Bid is potentially the result of the
seeming lack of interest of the Board with regard to the Qwest
overtures). Clearly, any bid to purchase the Company (both in the
case of Verizon and Qwest) may have certain not- immediately
quantifiable aspects that would require consideration. However, to
accept a bid from Verizon that is 19% lower than the Qwest bid is
difficult to understand. To have failed to explore an alternative
form of the Initial Bid, in light of the substantial and continuing
interest Qwest has shown in owning MCI, seems unjustifiable. In
addition, our analysis suggests that a Qwest/MCI combination is
likely to require less divestitures and less time to complete than
the Proposed Merger. While Verizon is a larger and more stable
company than Qwest, such must be weighed against the fact that,
through a transaction with Qwest, current MCI shareholders would
participate much more meaningfully in the value created by having
the MCI assets under a new corporate umbrella. By its very nature,
investing in equity securities entails risks; by investing in MCI,
its current shareholder base has demonstrated a willingness to
incur a calculated, though substantial, risk with the view that the
potential rewards outweigh such risk. Further, the very traits of
Verizon that lend it the stability that seems to have driven in
some substantial part the Board's current reasoning -- its size,
its meaningful exposure to the wireless market, etc., -- create a
dynamic in which Verizon, quite frankly, would not be a
meaningfully different company subsequent to the Proposed Merger
than it is today. If current MCI shareholders wanted to participate
in Verizon's fortunes, they could have simply purchased Verizon
stock, and may still do so today. In addition to the superiority of
the Initial Bid based on today's security prices, a Qwest/MCI
transaction has the potential to transform both entities and
realize synergies in a value-creating manner not afforded by a
Verizon transaction. It is our understanding that the Board was
concerned with certain contingent liabilities of Qwest. Again, we
agree that the Board must weigh these issues. However, our
understanding of the timing of the events leading up to the
Proposed Merger causes us to wonder if the Board gave itself a
sufficient opportunity to conduct such an analysis. We note that
just yesterday, the Suspension and Debarment Official of the
General Services Administration issued a favorable letter to Qwest
in which it stated that "[b]ased upon all information contained in
the administrative record, I have concluded that the protection of
the Federal government's interest does not presently require that I
initiate administrative action against Qwest." Given the magnitude
of the superiority of the Initial Bid based on current trading
values, the Board should have taken the necessary steps to properly
investigate these matters in a complete and thoughtful manner, a
process that likely could not have been accomplished in such a
short time frame. Further, if press reports are correct that Qwest
had floated the potential for a $6.3 billion all-cash bid, such
indicates that Qwest might have been amenable to structuring a
transaction in a form that would largely mitigate any concerns the
Board may have had with the prospects of a combined Qwest/MCI. In
addition to the concern expressed by several of MCI's largest
shareholders, we would point out that a significant number of the
Company's shares have traded subsequent to the announcement of the
Proposed Merger at a price higher than that implied by the current
Verizon bid. We view this as a clear signal that such holders are
anticipating an offer from Qwest, and would be amenable to such a
transaction. Given the information currently available to us, we
believe that the Initial Offer was superior to the Proposed Merger.
Thus, should Qwest present MCI with a Subsequent Offer, we trust
that the Board, consistent with its fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder value (particularly given the enhanced scrutiny that
applies in the change of control context under Delaware law), would
give such a proposal its due and serious consideration. In the
event that the Board insists on proceeding with the Proposed Merger
notwithstanding the more value accretive transactions available to
the Board, the Board should note that Elliott intends not to vote
for the proposed merger with Verizon as currently structured.
Further, Elliott reserves all rights with regard to the past and
future conduct of the Board in connection with the potential
combinations with Qwest and Verizon. Should you have any questions,
please contact Scott Tagliarino at 212-506-2999. Very truly yours,
Elliott Associates, L.P. About Elliott Associates, L.P. Elliott
Associates, L.P. and its sister fund, Elliott International, L.P.
have more than $4.2 billion of capital under management as of
January 1, 2005. Founded in 1977, Elliott Associates is one of the
oldest hedge funds under continuous management. The Elliott funds'
investors include large institutions, high-net-worth individuals
and families, and employees of the firm. (1) This calculation is
based on the February 22, 2005 closing price of Qwest stock of
$3.94; 3.735 shares of Qwest per share of MCI; $7.50 of cash per
MCI shares; and four quarterly dividends of $0.40 per share. We
also note that the Initial Bid was 19% higher than the currently
contemplated Verizon transaction on February 14, 2005, the day the
Proposed Merger was announced (using the relevant closing prices as
of February 11, 2005). All numbers are exclusive of the $200
million break-up fee. (2) The Proposed Merger contemplates that MCI
shareholders will receive 0.4062 shares of Verizon stock and a
total of $6.00 of cash per MCI share. Based on the February 22,
2005 closing price of Verizon, this translates to an offer price of
$20.37. DATASOURCE: Elliott Associates, L.P. CONTACT: Scott
Tagliarino, +1-212-506-2999, +1-917-922-2364 cell, for Elliott
Associates, L.P.
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